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This paper explores a constructive revision of the conceptual underpinnings of Attachment
Theory through an encounter with the diverse elements of 4e cognition. Attachment relation-
ships involve the development of preference for one or a few carers and expectations about
their availability and responsiveness as a haven of safety and a base from which to explore. In
Attachment Theory, mental representations have been assigned a central organising role in
explaining attachment phenomena. The 4e cognition approaches in cognitive science raise a
number of questions about the development and interplay of attachment and cognition. These
include: (1) the nature of what Bowlby called “internal working models of attachment”; (2)
the extent to which the infant-carer dyad functions as an extension of the infant’s mind; and
(3) whether Bowlby’s attachment control system concept can be usefully re-framed in enac-
tive terms where traditional cognitivist representations are: (3i) substituted for sensorimotor
skill-focused mediating representations; (3ii) viewed as arising from autopoietic living organ-
isms and/or (3iii) mostly composed from the non-contentful mechanisms of basic minds?. A
theme that cross-cuts these research questions is how representations for capturing meaning,
and structures for adaptive control, are both required to explain the full range of behaviour
of interest to Attachment Theory researchers.
1. Introduction
The infant-caregiver relationship plays a central role not only in social and emotional
development, but also in exploration and learning (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978; Bowlby, 1969, 1988). A traditional cognitivist approach to explaining these phe-
nomena would emphasise internal information processing, located within the individual
mind. So this approach in Attachment Theory would focus on symbolic representations
that can be operated upon according to syntactic rules. A theoretical approach that
keeps cognition within the infant’s mind is seductive because of its conceptual simplicity
and because this approach is more easily implemented in cognitive models that focus on
the creation and transformation of internal representations (Petters, 2004, 2005, 2006b).
The elements of 4e cognition - viewing cognition as embodied, embedded, extended, and
enacted - all reject or radically reconfigure traditional cognitivism (Menary, 2010).
The embodied approach asks whether cognitive processing, using internal ‘mental’
representations, is influenced or replaced by the use of non-neural physical structures,
such as parts of an organism’s body in interaction with its environment (Rowlands, 2010).
The embedded and extended approaches are both variants of situated cognition (Rupert,
2010, p. 3-6) and ask the same question about the role of structures and processes outside
the bounds of an organism’s body. The enactivist approach views psychological activity
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as occurring in the dynamic engagement between organisms and their physical and social
context rather than within themselves (McGann, Jaegher, & Paolo, 2013). Enactivism
asks about the role of action in understanding the nature of cognitive processing and
subjective experience. Whilst the core ideas in Attachment Theory were set out by John
Bowlby in a series of papers and books between 1958 and 1988 (Bowlby, 1958, 1969,
1969 | 1982, 1973, 1980, 1988), the elements of 4e cognition are more recently defined
(Menary, 2010; Rowlands, 2010), but have many earlier conceptual antecedents (Clancy,
2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Gibson, 1986; Shapiro, 2010; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch,
1991).
Bowlby’s formulation of Attachment Theory includes cognitivist constructs, like Inter-
nal Working Models (IWMs) and hierarchical plans, through which relationship patterns
are represented and processed internally as symbols. However, he was also inspired by
Systems Theory (Bowlby, 1969, p. 102), emphasising that an infant’s main caregiver is
the most salient part of the infant’s environment. So Attachment Theory conceptualises
the infant-mother relationship as being between two active partners. Therefore, contem-
porary approaches from situated cognition can form a natural updating for Bowlby’s
systems approach, and may also help refocus and reformulate cognitivist elements that
Bowlby proposed within Attachment Theory. How then should Attachment Theory re-
spond when viewed through the lens provided by 4e cognition approaches in cognitive
science? And which elements of 4e cognition provide the best match for the requirements
of a theoretical revision for Attachment Theory?
1.1. Embodiment
The embodied approach covers a broad range of theories about what embodied cognition
is and how it differs from cognitivism (Shapiro, 2010). In general, this approach views the
body and physical world as the “context or milieu” for cognition, rather than cognition
conceived as the operation of disembodied algorithms (Petters, 2014; Shapiro, 2010). In
their reviews, Shapiro (2010) and Rowlands (2010) presents conservative to more radical
embodied interpretations for cognitive phenomena. A conservative approach to embodi-
ment explains that we cannot understand how organisms can gain and hold information
about themselves and the world without thinking about how central processing struc-
tures and mechanisms are affected by their embodiment. In this view embodiment merely
provides constraints on the concepts an organism can acquire within a computational and
representational understanding of the mind. Or more radical embodied interpretations
replace cognitivist representations and processing with bodily interactions, and can even
suggest that the non-neural aspects of body and world become the constituents of cog-
nitive processes (Rowlands, 2010, p 54-56). These reviews also show there are different
ways to be radically embodied. For example, by either focusing on replacing representa-
tions (Shapiro, 2010, p. 114-157), or an anti-cartesianism which focuses on the location
of cognition (Rowlands, 2010, p 10-13). This paper will consider how close Attachment
Theory is, as actually set-down by Bowlby, to the embodied cognition approach within
4e cognition. It will also consider the future prospects for embodied thinking in the
attachment domain.
1.2. Embeddedness and Extension
The hypotheses of embedded and extended cognition are competing theories in situated
cognition that both give greater emphasis to the role that situations and context play
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in human cognition than traditional cognitivism (Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998;
Rowlands, 2010; Rupert, 2004, 2010). The extended approach is more radical, claim-
ing that external supports become part of a person’s cognitive apparatus. In extended
cognition, what constitutes cognition extends far out into the environment, beyond the
boundaries of brain and of body. The embedded approach is still strongly anti-cognitivist,
but sees cognition embedded in external support rather than constituted of external
structures (Rowlands, 2010). The embedded approach suggests that internal cognitive
processes depend on the way that the environment outside of the body is structured. In
an embedded view of the cognitive processes underlying attachment interactions, inter-
nal cognitive processes that guide interpersonal attachment behaviours would only run
effectively in ‘tandem’ with particular arrangements of the external environment, and
without this tightly coupled scaffolding internal processes would work less well or not at
all (Rowlands, 2010). A key question is: whether attachment relationships can sometimes
be conceived as extending cognition or are better thought of as embedding cognition?
1.3. Enactivism
In an enactivist view mind and subjective experience are not seen as inherent in, or
arising from, the individual, but as emerging, from the interaction between organisms
and their surroundings (McGann et al., 2013). This includes interaction with elements of
embodiment such as dynamical and whole-body actions (Fuchs & Jaegher, 2009). Rather
than relying on disembodied passive representations, how an organism acts on the world
and the resulting ways in which the world reacts are key to explaining the nature of
cognition (Rowlands, 2010). Enactivism also holds that organisms actively participate
in the generation of meaning which arises from a “dialogue between the sense making
activity of an agent and the responses from its environment” (Fuchs & Jaegher, 2009, p.
470). Some variants of enactivism are also concerned with explaining how subjective ex-
perience can only arise from autonomous systems that self-produce and self-maintain. So
other key questions we can ask in an encounter between Attachment Theory and 4e cog-
nition are: whether enaction, rather than traditional forms of representation, is a better
way to think about how previous experiences mediate ongoing adaptive behaviour?; and,
can the attachment control system be revised to act as an enactive “lived experiential
structure” (Petters, 2014)(Thompson, 2007, p. xvi)? This paper will follow Hutto and
Myin (2013) in presenting contemporary enactivism as comprised three varieties: sen-
sorimotor enactivism, autopoietic enactivism and radical enactivism. These approaches
provide a particularly broad perspective on how anti-cognitivist approaches may provide
new directions for Attachment Theory.
1.4. Why 4e cognition?
This paper is the latest in a series of papers to explore how the information processing
underpinnings for Attachment Theory as set out by Bowlby between the 1950’s and
1980’s may be updated (Petters, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Petters & Waters, 2010). Previous
attempts at revision have focused on revising the attachment control system in terms of
internally located disembodied structures and mechanisms. For example, Petters (2005,
2006a, 2006b) describes autonomous agents which simulate infant attachment behaviour
patterns and the ontogenetic development of individual difference attachment categories.
Whereas Petters and Waters (2010) describes how the attachment control system maybe
in part composed of Bayesian mechanisms. In each of these papers, the intention in
3
May 13, 2016 Connection Science COS˙pettersAttachment˙4e˙cog˙revisionv4
challenging Attachment Theory with recent ideas from cognitive science was to revise
rather than replace or reject the core elements of Attachment Theory. So these papers
maintain Bowlby’s core idea that there are high level attachment representations like
natural language which operate alongside lower level attachment control structures. The
current attempt in this paper to re-imagine the information processing foundations of
Attachment Theory by comparing it to all four strands of 4e cognition aims to broaden
and deepen this programme of constructive revision.
However, the question might be posed, why revise Attachment Theory in response to
all the separate strands of 4e cognition? The four strands of 4e cognition are certainly
not a longstanding categorisation and are brought together as much by the traditional
cognitivism they oppose than what they have common. Rowlands (2010, p. 219) recounts
how the term was coined by Shaun Gallagher over lunch in 2006. There has since been
a conference and a special issue focused on 4e cognition(Rowlands, 2010, p. 219). As
Menary notes, one might view the separate strands of 4e cognition as not possessing any
homogeneity and when treated together it may cause us to “miss out on the nuances
and sometimes genuine incompatibilities between them” (Menary, 2010, p. 459). How-
ever, it is the diversity of 4e cognition approaches that adds value to the analysis set out
in this paper, allowing different components of the 4e cognition approaches to provide
contrasting insights and benefits for the Attachment Theory framework. This paper will
see how see how diverse elements from 4e cognition emphasise embodied and situated
perspectives, and sensorimotor skills, in attachment interactions. These perspectives will
also highlight the requirement for an explanation of subjective experience in the attach-
ment domain and explain how mechanisms for adaptive control and linguistic mediation
of behaviour can be combined in an integrated attachment control system.
1.5. Bowlby formulated the attachment control system concept but did not
specify it in detail
John Bowlby’s interest in developmental psychology started early in his career (van der
Horst, 2011). After working with maladjusted children, he was training as a medical doc-
tor when he added psychoanalysis to his studies. Melanie Klein acted as his supervisor
during this psychoanalytic training. His initial research focus was towards understanding
particular normative social and emotional phenomena such as separation distress and be-
reavement (Bowlby, 1960). In explaining these phenomena, Bowlby initially worked from
within a broad psychoanalytic explanatory framework. However, Bowlby disagreed with
the mental energy and drive reduction models that psychoanalysis proposed to explain
such internal complexity and continuity across development (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura,
Posada, & Richters, 1991). He also disagreed with the retrospective research method of
clinical reconstructions and the idea that behaviour is driven by internal phantasy that
is de-linked from current experience (van der Horst, 2011). Bowlby did want to consider
how individuals imagine good and bad future outcomes. He just believed that the reality
of the current moment and real day to day past experiences around emotionally valenced
possible attachment outcomes like loss, separation and reunion anchor predictions about
future attachment related outcomes. Therefore Bowlby placed far more emphasis on
the observation of current behaviour than did Melanie Klein and other psychoanalysts
(van der Horst, 2011). All these factors led to him rejecting psychoanalytic theory and its
related research methods as a basis for explaining social and emotional development. In-
stead, he formulated a new explanatory framework by combining scientifically respectable
ideas that originated across different disciplines.
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One of Bowlby’s goals was to construct a motivation theory that could account for
infant behavioural sensitivity to social context. However, whilst he wanted to abandon
some of the aspects of the psychoanalytic framework with which he disagreed, he wanted
to conserve some key insights of psychoanalysis such as the ideas that the cognitive and
emotional life of human infants is complex and that the nature of early attachment re-
lationships have a lasting impact, acting as prototypes of later romantic and caregiving
relationships (Waters et al., 1991). Bowlby also wished to conserve the idea that the
phenomena of interest in social and emotional bonding are bigger than the ‘proxy’ of
behaviour. For both Psychoanalysis and Attachment Theory, overt behaviour (for exam-
ple, duration of protest following separation) does not equate with strength of emotional
connection (Waters et al., 1991). In both of these frameworks, responses are guided by
rich internal structures and mechanisms.
In his first presentation of Attachment Theory proper, Bowlby (1958) provided an
alternative motivational basis for attachment by replacing a psychoanalytic explana-
tion based on Freudian instincts with a framework based on ethological behaviours. In
this evolutionary ethological framework for attachment, Behaviour Systems control be-
haviours such as proximity seeking to the mother, sociality, fear, and exploration, which
are inherently motivated and so do not need to be activated as the by-product of any
more fundamental process (Harlow, 1958). Each of these behaviours carry out a species
specific function that has survived in the genome because its functions have contributed
to biological fitness.
Two limitations that arise from conceiving of the attachment system as an instinctive
behaviour system are that: (1) this framework is too simple to explain different stages in
attachment development; and (2) it gave too much emphasis to observable triggers for
behaviour rather than seeing behaviour arising from richer internal states and the ability
to engage in imaginative ‘what if’ reasoning when an individual looks ahead to possible
futures.
In his more mature theoretical work, Bowlby still included ethological mechanisms but
also drew increasingly on currently popular concepts from control systems theory, cyber-
netics, artificial intelligence, and Piagetian theory. Bowlby replaced Freud’s concept of
psychical energy and its discharge (Bowlby, 1969, p. 18), with the concept of an attach-
ment control system. He presented reflex behaviours and behavioural chaining of fixed
action patterns as an example of a simple organising principle for control systems, and
hierarchical planning as much more complex and flexible (Bowlby, 1969, p. 76). Bowlby
showed how ‘simple’ mechanisms could interact in complex ways by chaining and alter-
nation. Behavioural patterns arising when fixed action patterns have been trained into
complex sequences can be mistaken for behaviours directed by more complex goal cor-
rected mechanisms because of the sensitive matching of response to stimuli. According
to Bowlby simple plans can be formed when several goal corrected steps are chained
together, and each step must be completed before the next step is taken. More complex
plans were also proposed where simple plans were formed into plan hierarchies. Ulti-
mately plans come to be represented linguistically (Bowlby, 1969, p. 77). Goal corrected
feedback mechanisms were also introduced by Bowlby from control systems theory and
cybernetics to play an important part in the ‘purposiveness’ of the attachment control
system framework (Bowlby, 1969, p. 54). Whereas younger infants may produce complex
behaviour by chaining and training of simple mechanisms like reflexes and fixed action
patterns, older infants, children and adults use more complex control mechanisms such
as plans represented in natural language. But simple and complex mechanisms co-exist,
with each sometimes overridden by the other. Internal Working Models (IWMs) and nat-
ural language allowed higher level processes of integration and control (more on IWMs
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in section 2).
Attachment behaviours range from non-verbal actions to the verbal narratives that
people construct about their relationships, and can be observed from infancy to adult
contexts including caregiving and romantic relationship. So it is unsurprising that to ex-
plain diverse behaviours a diverse range of information processing structures and mech-
anisms have been invoked within the attachment control system - which we might today
term a cognitive architecture.
2. From Internal Working Models to Embodied Working Models
Internal working models (IWMs) have in the past often been presented in Attachment
Theory as cognitivist constructs like schemas or scripts (Bretherton & Munholland,
2008). The purpose of this section is two-fold: firstly to show that despite the fact that
Bowlby’s later writing and much contemporary attachment research views attachment
representations as symbolic and abstract, Bowlby’s early formulations were broader in
scope; and, secondly, to report empirical evidence for the importance of bodily sensation
and embodied representation in the attachment domain.
Throughout his career, Bowlby restricted the term ‘Internal Working Models’ (IWMs)
to models of self and other in attachment relationships. Their principal information
processing function is to allow predictions to be made about the likely outcomes of taking
actions within a given environment. Bowlby explicitly compared the role of IWMs to the
imaginative function of the Internal Worlds of psychoanalysis:
“The environmental and organismic models described here as neces-
sary parts of a sophisticated biological control system are, of course, none
other than the internal worlds of traditional psychoanalytic theory seen in
a new perspective.” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 81)
Bowlby’s IWMs are information processing constructs which store, manipulate, and
transmit attachment related world knowledge and expectations about its caregiver’s
availability and responsiveness. They allow the individual to “conduct small scale ex-
periments within the head” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 81). The information storage role of IWMs
includes capturing the relation-structure of attachment phenomena, not every aspect
of reality but enough to formulate plans and make decisions in relation to attachment
goals, and make possible the evaluation of alternative actions. These expectations are
derived from the carer’s past performance. At a finer grain of analysis, IWMs are storing
spatio-temporal causal relations among the events, actions, objects, goals and concepts
represented. Bowlby emphasises the requirements for IWMs to be updated. He also ob-
serves that pathological sequelae of separation and bereavement can be understood in
terms of out of date models or half revised models which may contain consistencies and
confusions (Bowlby, 1969, p. 82).
IWMs of self and attachment figure develop in a complementary manner (Bowlby,
1969). For example if the carer is responsive the self is valued. Their operation can
be seen when an attached individual is in an anxious state and considers how to gain
proximity to their attachment figure. IWMs allow the individual to predict the outcomes
of possible actions to achieve their set-goal of proximity. They can then choose an action
likely to increase security and not provoke a negative response from their attachment
figure (Bowlby, 1973, p. 254-263).
Bowlby invokes IWMs at early stages in development and also later on, when linguis-
tic skills and conscious reflection can enable models to become more adequate ((Bowlby,
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1969), p 84). So IWMs have been presented as transforming from sensorimotor repre-
sentations in pre-linguistic infants to manipulable internal simulations in older children
and adults that can enable short-term predictions, and conscious reflections on past,
ongoing and future relationships ((Bretherton & Munholland, 2008), p 102). Current
attachment research frequently investigates IWMs through studies of memory talk, nar-
rative completion, semi-projective measures and story-telling, with adults and children
(Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Dallos, 2006) - naturally linking IWMS to symbolic
constructs from Artificial Intelligence like schemas and scripts (Petters & Waters, 2010).
In his later writing Bowlby described IWMs in symbolic terms, for example:
“In reaching the decision to utilise certain actions rather than others
the attachment system is conceived as drawing on the symbolic represen-
tations or working models, of the attachment figure, the general environ-
ment and the self, which are already stored and available to the system”
((Bowlby, 1969 | 1982), p. 373).
So Bowlby proposed IWMs as structures accessible to language and which sometimes
allowed conscious simulation of attachment outcomes and the ability to reflect through
language about their attachment interactions and status (Dallos, 2006). However, in
earlier writing, Bowlby compared IWMs to analogue representations. For example, in his
1969 formulation of IWMs, when Bowlby suggested that they can be used to conduct
‘small-scale experiments within the head’ he notes that this notion would be an obvious
possibility to electrical engineers familiar with analogue computers. Bowlby also refers
to anti-aircraft guns that operate using cybernetic control mechanisms ((Bowlby, 1969),
p 44) to exemplify how analogue control systems can set their own goals.
Looking back prior to 1969 to Bowlby’s sources for the IWM concept provides added de-
tail on how analogue representations can be conceived as mental models. Bowlby adopted
the concept of Internal Working Models from the biologist J.Z. Young, whose 1964 treat-
ment of Working Models is decidedly unambiguous in its preference for analogue over
digital representations as a basis for Working Models in natural systems. As Young noted:
“ What we commonly call the structure of the nervous system deter-
mines what it does. It is not a general purpose computer at all. [...] the
machine may be itself a representation of the environment and its parts
are pre-selected to perform certain calculations in relations to the latter.”
((Young, 1964), p 39)
So analogue working models do not possess the representational property of arbitrari-
ness, and can require no transduction or abstraction because they can use the physical
substrate of the body to act as embodied representations or embodied control mecha-
nisms. Going back further in time, Young acquired the working model concept from its
original source - the cybernetician Kenneth Craik. In The Nature of Explanation (Craik,
1943), Craik first discussed how working models can be used in science. Physical systems
can act as models which help scientists explain natural phenomena because their physical
operation captures key aspects of how the target system operates:
“By a model we thus mean any physical or chemical system which
has a similar relation-structure to that of the processes it imitates. By
‘relation-structure’ I do not mean some obscure non-physical entity which
attends the model, but the fact that it is a physical working model which
works in the same way as the process it parallels, in the aspects under
consideration at any moment. Thus, the model need not resemble the real
7
May 13, 2016 Connection Science COS˙pettersAttachment˙4e˙cog˙revisionv4
object pictorially; Kelvin’s tide-predictor, which consists of a number of
pulleys on levers, does not resemble a tide in appearance, but it works in
the same way in certain essential respects” ((Craik, 1943), p 51)
According to Craik, an organism can then possess working models that rely on physical
structure to represents its self and environment, it may configure the working model to act
as memories of past events and then run this model forward in time to make predictions
or imagine the results of differing actions (Craik, 1943, p. 61). Bowlby incorporated
this representational and simulative aspect of working models into Attachment Theory
(Bowlby, 1969, p. 80).
The distinction between analogue and typical cognitivist representations like (discrete,
arbitrary) symbols is important because analogue representations are much less flexible,
are tied to the physical (embodied) properties of the medium in which they are im-
plemented, and cannot easily be used to reason generally about a space of all possible
actions. So analogue computation relies on a physical or embodied substrate in a manner
in which discrete symbol processing computations do not. These distinctions matter for
computational modelling of attachment behaviour in artificial systems and for clinicians
who are concerned to activate, de-activate, measure and transform attachment repre-
sentations as part of research or therapy with humans (Dallos, 2006). Many attachment
responses are non-linguistic reactions to ongoing dynamic interplay between attached
partners, and may be effectively mediated by less flexible analogue representations. Lin-
guistic reflection on attachment issues will require a more flexible representation. What
interconnections are required (if any) between these kinds of representation is an area re-
quiring further research. It may be that mechanisms for adaptive behavioural control and
mechanisms for conscious linguistic reflection operate in parallel without any ‘cross-talk’.
That Bowlby would invoke analogue computation and representations in his first for-
mulation of IWMs might seem surprising given the contemporary predominance of the
linguistic/symbolic approach to IWMs in Attachment Theory. It is in part explained
by the waning popularity of analogue computers and cybernetic notions. In the period
between the end of the second world war and the late 1960s when Bowlby’s initially
adoption of the working models concept, digital computing had gained a leading posi-
tion but analogue computing and cybernetic theories remained a significant alternative
to digital computing and the new Artificial Intelligence approach (Boden, 2006; Small,
2000). In addition, the seeming change in emphasis from analogue representations in 1969
to symbolic in 1982 may not represent a completely radical change in Bowlby’s concep-
tualisation because Bowlby was vague in the representational details he proposed. As
Bretherton and Mulholland note, Bowlby’s formulation of the representational basis for
attachment “was a promising conceptual framework to be filled in by others” ((Bretherton
& Munholland, 2008), p 103). However, perhaps the key issue was that in the 1960s Arti-
ficial Intelligence was less prominent in comparison with Cybernetics than it would be in
the future. So the cybernetic view on issues like meaning and control held greater sway.
This was consequential because researchers in Cybernetics under-emphasised representa-
tional distinctions and the challenges arising from consideration of high level processes.
As Boden notes:
“most cyberneticians seemed to see no difference between pure self-
equilibration (as in homeostasis), purposive behaviour directed to some
observable object (as in guided missiles), and goal seeking directed to some
intentional end (as in human deliberation and planning)((Boden, 2006),
p 220)
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The eclipse of Cybernetics by Artificial Intelligence may have led to Bowlby’s switch
from invoking an analogue basis for IWM in 1969 to symbolic basis for IWMs in 1982.
So further research needs to integrate the findings of embodied working models with
research on higher level linguistic and reflective processes. So providing an approach
which brings diverse representational forms together in the attachment control system,
bringing back together a adaptive control and fully intentional thought and reasoning
(Petters & Waters, 2010).
Analogue representations are not what researchers in embodied cognition usually refer
to as examples of embodiment (Shapiro, 2010). Instead, they give instances of how actual
body parts or neural areas specialised for bodily sensation or action are important for
cognition. Although Bowlby and many other attachment researchers often refer to IWMs
in cognitivist terms (Bretherton & Munholland, 2008), there is strong empirical evidence
for the importance of embodiment in attachment processes. In the first Strange Situation
study (Ainsworth et al., 1978), visual ratings of physical contact between mother and
infants show ‘sinking in during contact’ is a key distinguishing variable for insecure
avoidant and insecure ambivalent/resistant infants in the home observations (Petters,
2006a, page 185). The complex and vital role of physical contact in the development of
attachment has also been highlighted by studies of attachment in rats (Hofer, 1995). Close
physical contact has been shown in rats to act as a hidden regulator of an infant rat’s
behaviour. When rat pups are separated from their mothers they showed slowed heart
rate and decreased temperature and activity. However if the rats were kept warm their
temperature still fell but they became much more active. After a series of systematic
experiments it was found that different stimuli from the mother rat, such as tactile,
nutritional and thermal stimuli, regulate different infant behavioural and physiological
systems.
Links have also been drawn with IWMs and recent neuroscience research which presents
IWMs as affording embodied simulation of the intentions of others ((Bretherton &
Munholland, 2008), p 109). Bretherton and Munholland (2016) review recent neuro-
imaging findings relevant to the functions of an attachment IWM. They present studies
which investigate functions relevant to working model construction and operation, in-
cluding processes of: emotional appraisal, multi-model integration, self-other distinction,
social observation matching, behavioural monitoring and behaviour choice, and processes
of prospection and imagining of social outcomes. They show that these functions are of-
ten linked to and rely on brain sites specialised for supporingt perceptual and motor
functions. So an increasing number of brain imaging studies are confirming an embodied
view of IWMs (Bretherton & Munholland, 2016). So viewing IWMs as embodied simu-
lations is not only fully in the ‘spirit’ of Bowlby’s original conception for IWMs, but also
matches the ‘word’ of what he wrote about IWMs when he first introduced them (Pouw
& de Jong, 2015).
3. Attachment relationships and situated cognition
Rupert (2010) presents embeddedness and extension as two varieties of situated cogni-
tion. So before looking at these competing hypotheses in the next section, this section
will consider how Attachment Theory can be enhanced by ideas from situated cognition.
The idea that infants, older children and even adult attachment partners all look to their
carers as information sources about the broader world is a familiar one. For example,
from the perspective of the socially situated mind, infant social referencing and joint at-
tention between infant and carer may be seen as physical actions that make the infant’s
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mental computations faster, more reliable or less effortful by intimately linking internal
infant cognition with external support (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Petters & Waters, 2013;
Tomasello, 1999). So taking a situated cognition approach enriches attachment theory
by providing a more complete view of how infants gain information about environments
from their caregivers.
An evolutionary stance and situated cognition approach are clearly complementary.
We should expect that at every age, but especially in infancy and childhood, an effective
attachment figure who is a primary caregiver should possess the goal to enhance and
enrich their cared for individual’s mental capacities - elevating ongoing activities and
supporting development to higher performance over time. This might be taken to mean
that an attachment figure aids those they care for by providing certain affordances in
the social environment. This will be more important in infancy. In moment to moment
interactions, a carer (if she recognises what her infant is up to and is skilful and moti-
vated) adapts her support (including extending and transforming it through the course of
the interaction). She may reach for the approaching infant, then make adjustments as it
comes close and makes efforts to be picked up. Much the same may occur in her support
for exploration. Caregivers also help to label, conceptualise, and structure information
(Clark, 2008, p.44)(Petters & Waters, 2013).
The dialogic nature of the infant-mother relationship is exemplified by many types
of intimate and dynamic interaction, including: the infant’s active participation in co-
operative games, the infant directing the mother’s attention to acts by itself, use of objects
as topics in infant-mother dialogues, and social and emotional referencing. The mutually
contingent nature of these dialogues is demonstrated by experimental studies which per-
turb the contingency of caregiver or infant responses, and in observational research of
infant interactivity with depressed mothers (Reddy, Hay, Murray, & Trevarthen, 1997).
A benefit to taking a situated cognition approach to attachment phenomena is therefore
that it places the interaction between mother and infant centre-stage. We can view such
close-coupled partners as being situated within action loops, with both partners subserv-
ing the active partnership and the focus of action criss-crossing between partners (Clark,
1998; Wilson & Clark, 2008). In such systems, caregivers can support ‘soft assembly’ of
developing attachment competencies because secure attachment patterns are described
in terms of response to set-goals rather than set actions ((Clark, 1998), p 44). So soft
assembly of attachment behaviour routines can be arrived at by multiple paths but are
planful because they are driven by the infant’s goals and the carer’s support towards
those goals. Caregivers can also help scaffold infant development by directing the child
toward a correct/established outcome/solution/attitude or belief. When co-constructing
they also help the child take a course toward own-defined ends or end points. Ainsworth’s
maternal sensitivity scales, particularly ‘sensitivity to signals’, and ‘cooperation vs. inter-
ference with ongoing behaviour’, (Ainsworth et al., 1978) show how Attachment Theory
has operationalised measures that are relevant to the kinds of situated interactions that
exist in the attachment domain. Infants adapt to the particular pattern of responsiveness
that caregivers provide (Ainsworth et al., 1978). So part of the reason that individual
differences in attachment patterns in infancy and childhood change so little through de-
velopment is the stabilising effect of being situated in such a closely coupled caregiving
relationship with a carer that responds with a particular pattern that can extend over
ontogenetic development (Waters, Merrick, Treboux, Crowell, & Albersheim, 2000).
Importantly, situated support by caregivers can be at the level of behaviour and at the
level of information provision and explicit theories about the world. Bowlby describes how
caregivers support infants by manipulating the environment and providing information
directly through language use so that “instead of each one of us having to build his
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environmental and organismic models entirely for himself, he can draw on models built
by others” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 82).
4. Deciding between two hypotheses in situated cognition: embeddedness
and extension
The previous section of the paper has shown a possible beneficial pay-off for Attachment
Theory of an encounter with situated cognition. This is because the situated approach
provides a good match for the kinds of intimate interactions that are of interest within
Attachment Theory. From this point on in this section we will consider the relative merits
of re-framing Attachment Theory in terms of the hypotheses of embedded and extended
cognition. These are competing and mutually exclusive explanations from within situated
cognition that in the attachment domain can explain how caregivers provide cognitive
support. The hypothesis of extended cognition suggests that in some of the above exam-
ples of attachment interactions, if the infant’s ongoing computational needs are met by
sensitive and timely support from his or her carer in such a way that the infant treats
this support as part of their own cognitive processes then we might say that the carers
cognitive support has become part of the infant’s extended mind (Clark, 2008; Clark
& Chalmers, 1998). For these examples to count as mind extension, caregiver cognitive
support and information provision to the infant must be strongly trusted, relied upon
and accessible (Petters & Waters, 2013). If these criteria are met then what is occurring
is extension of mental states from an infant onto their caregiver. So in this view, the
carer is actually extending the infant mind by incorporating the carer’s help within the
infant’s cognitive operations - the carer’s help becomes part of the infant’s mind (Petters
& Waters, 2013). For these same examples of intimately integrated interactions between
infant cognition and carer support, the hypothesis of embedded cognition views infant
cognition and carer support of that cognition as clearly demarcated and separate. This
hypothesis considers that “cognitive processes depend very heavily, in hitherto unexpected
ways, on organismically external props and on the structure of the external environment
in which cognition takes place” ((Rupert, 2004) p 393). and that “certain cognitive pro-
cesses lean heavily on environmental structures and scaffoldings but not thereby include
those structures and scaffoldings themselves”((Clark, 2008), p 111). So for this encounter
between Attachment Theory and 4e cognition, accepting the hypothesis of embedded
cognition means accepting a more conservative interpretation of the situated cognition
approach than the more radical hypothesis of the extended mind.
Rupert (2004) sets out two main reasons for preferring embedded explanations over ex-
tended explanations which arise from considering non-social cognitive extension (Clark,
2008). Most examples of extended cognition involve inorganic objects in the environ-
ment (such as a mathematician doing their ‘working’ on paper) providing the cognitive
extension. The first criticism of extended cognition highlights the profound differences
that appear to distinguish inner and outer contributions in extended cognition when
cognition is extended onto such inorganic objects (Clark, 2008). However, this criticism
is much weaker when applied to the social case as it is a carer that does the extending.
So there are not such profound differences in the supporting substrate for cognition be-
tween cognition inside the infant’s brain and cognitive support originating from inside the
carer’s brain. It is just that messages or other information have to cross from the carer’s
brain through the non-neural, non-embodied external environment before supporting the
infant’s cognition. A second criticism is the apparent scientific cost of any wholesale en-
dorsement of extended cognition onto a motley collection of inorganic objects because
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it gives undue attention to transient external props and aids. In this view, following
the extended mind hypothesis means scientists are not researching a suite of integrated
persisting organismically grounded capacities (Clark, 2008; Wilson & Clark, 2008), and
looking at developmental examples of cognitive extension onto inorganic objects is a se-
ries of separated developmental segments with external cognition onto different objects.
Using a ball or balance beam may be a good example of mind extension at one age, but a
year later the best example may involve a completely different object in a different task
or action. Again, the social case of mind extension in the attachment domain mitigates
this criticism. Extended cognition does not only deal with transient external props and
aids when a main carer provides enduring support and continuity between otherwise
disparate contexts.
However, a similar issue of transient and possibly inconsistent cognitions arises when
thinking of social mind extension in the attachment domain. This is because infants and
children do not attach to just one single carer (Howes, 1999) but may attach closely to
mother, father, nanny, sibling, and others. So when infants who use their carers minds
to extend their own mind, are they constituted of the minds of more than one person
over time if they have more than one attachment figure? Do the infant’s attitudes and
beliefs change depending on who they are engaging with?
Social interactions in infant-carer dyads are likely to be asymmetric - with caregivers
providing the extra support and the infant being supported. Over the long-term care-
givers attempt to socialise and indoctrinate infants in many ways, both positive and
negative, that will impact the developing meaning a child gains of their attachment his-
tory (Petters & Waters, 2013). Healthy, unhealthy or outright pathological beliefs about
the infant’s self and relationships can enter into a infant’s mind because of what they
see, hear or experience with their caregiver. Their caregivers may simply present beliefs
which the children then adopt. However, in these cases the caregiver might be the original
source of beliefs, but it is not justified to say that these are extended cognitions (Petters
& Waters, 2013). This is because the infant’s internal memory is where these beliefs are
constituted over time, the infant no longer accesses these beliefs from their carer once
the carer is no longer presenting them.
Infants learn to trust how well their carers provide security, and respond accordingly.
Research has shown that young children do not just hold sensorimotor representations
of the quality of their attachment relationships. For example, attachment relationship
quality can be assessed by the simple drawings young children make of their families
(Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). A more novel recent finding is that infants and young
children may filter information that they get from their carers according to how reliable
the carer is as a secure-base provider. Securely attached children aged 4-5 years are shown
to hold a more nuanced and realistic view of their caregiver as a provider of information
than insecure children do (Corriveau et al., 2009). We can say that secure 4 year olds
tend to use their carers more in ‘epistemic actions’ (where the action is not intended
to change the state of the world but gain information about the world) (Clark, 2008).
Insecure 4 year olds not only trust their carers less to provide security, they also seem
to trust their carers less to just provide accurate knowledge about the world (Corriveau
et al., 2009). Does this finding provide support for the extended mind hypothesis rather
than that infants are merely embedded in a caregiving environment? Corriveau et al.
(2009) does show that some children trust their carers as information providers more
than other children do. But the extended mind hypothesis requires a very high level of
trust. After the first six months of age infants or children might trust their caregivers
this much, but equally, even if in secure relationships, they might have high levels of
trust that fall short from this standard.
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In early childhood through to adolescence we might characterise attachment devel-
opment as a gradual lessening in the strength of attachment bonds, with an increase in
autonomy, and increase in the questioning of information from the caregiver by the child.
If attachment bonds are lessening as autonomy increases should we still view infants as
using their carers as mind extenders - when mind extension involves such a decrease of
autonomy and lessening of the boundaries between different selves? The age at which
there is likely most justification for attributing mind extension is the earliest ages where
attachment proper is not formed or only just forming. We should be more accepting of
claims to extended cognition in infants and younger children, because the caregiver’s
interactions are more long-lasting, they are relied upon more, and when there are less
infant cognitive resources and routines for not believing (Gilbert, 1991). So making ac-
ceptance of information from the carer as if it were an infant’s own beliefs easier and
more likely.
A number of recent papers (Greenwood, 2013; Krueger, 2013; Varga, 2015) propose
that closely coupled synchronous interactions between mothers and young infants can
involve cognitions that extend beyond the individual. Varga (2015) argues that a form
of ‘emergent extended cognition’ is needed to capture dyadic synchronic interactions
early in infancy like temporal and affective coordination of non-verbal microbehaviours
including facial expressions, voice tone matching, and bodily interactions. Varga empha-
sises that these interactions are not controllable by one or other participant in the way
that a tool like a pen or notepad could be controllable by its user. Neither are they
reducible in the sense of relying on part of a system. Instead, these interactions possess
‘continuous reciprocal causation’ that relies upon emergent extended cognitions between
both participants. These kinds of interactions are germane to attachment development
but attachment interaction describes a broader range of different ways that mothers and
infants interact, and describes how relationship interactions change through the life-span
(Petters & Waters, 2013). Greenwood (2013) argues that deep functional integration
of carers in the cognition of their infants can be considered a form of contingent tran-
scranialism which shapes emotional ontogenesis. Similarly, Krueger (2013) links the fine
grained details of physical interventions and shared attention with cultural norms and
practices in his normative account of the ontogenesis of the socially extended mind. How-
ever, as Petters and Waters (2013) discuss, caregivers vary greatly in responsiveness and
sensitivity but all infants in normative (non-abusive) caregiving environments end up
becoming attached. So unless the requirements for mind extension are greatly weakened
mind extension should not be seen as a pre-requisite for normative emotional ontogenesis.
Varga and Greenwood make similar points about the direction of control in socially
extended cognition. For Varga, extension emerges by both partners relinquishing con-
trol to better mirror their partner’s response. For Greenwood, extension is an example
of a ‘world-to-brain transcranial event’. However, more work needs to be done in dis-
tinguishing Greenwood’s world-to-brain interactions from Rupert’s view of the brain as
embedded-in-the-world in a way that intimately structures cognition. Both Varga and
Greenwood draw upon a conception of mind extension which focuses “on the comple-
mentarity of the internal and external resources and their consequent integration into
cognitive wholes” (Greenwood, 2013, p. 424). So they put the ‘cognitive whole’ produced
by a dyad in primary focus because it is contributed to by both parts of the dyad. This is
reminiscent of Winnicott’s well-quoted saying: “There is no such thing as a baby, only a
baby and a mother” (Winnicott, 1965, page 39). It is also consonant with psychoanalytic
ideas on the absence of self-other distinction (Hughes, 1989). Attachment Theory is clear
that infant and caregiver behavioural predispositions complement each other and are
evolved to do so. For example, infant secure base behaviour complements caregivers pro-
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vision of safety. So we should expect complementarity leading to functional integration.
However, even at young ages we should remember the lessons of evolutionary psychology
and in particular parent-offspring conflict (Simpson, 1999; Trivers, 1974). Infants and
caregivers disagree about much - when to eat, what to eat, where to crawl, and what to
play with. So young children do spend quite a lot of time in explicit behavioural con-
flict with their caregivers, and unseen implicit conflicts are also likely to occur, even in
the womb (Haig, 1993). So as an evolutionary design principle, having infants trust their
caregivers so much that they regularly and routinely extend their minds onto them might
be questioned. So Rupert’s criticism of the extended mind - that, whilst there may be
some examples of extended mind use, they do not form a comprehensive suite of tools
- may apply to the attachment domain. Infants may occasionally off-load cognitive pro-
cesses onto their carers, but as they get older, this support may be more like scaffolding
in line with the hypothesis of embedded cognition (Rupert, 2010). They may also form
‘cognitive wholes’ but this will happen in isolated episodes early in development.
Considering a place for both the embedded and extended hypotheses in the attachment
domain may facilitate valuable new thinking and promote further research. For example
in exploring how children develop from implicit use of their mother as a cognitive support
to explicit use. Questions include whether there are required sequences in these kind of
changes, as opposed to trajectories that depend on various facts about the different
genomes or different environments.
Earlier approaches to the extended mind hypothesis focus on demarcating extended
and non-extended states or processes by considering the parity principle. This assesses
whether if: “a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head,
we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process” (Clark &
Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). If the answer is ‘yes’ then the external state or process is con-
sidered a constituent part of the overall cognitive task or operation. This demarcation
rules out examples where the external element supports the cognitive task with differ-
ent properties and functions than would occur internally. Since complementing rather
than strictly copying cognitive functions is often the point of relying on external entities
(Heersmink, 2015), a complementarity principle for demarcating extended from brain-
bound processes has been proposed in addition to the parity principle (Heersmink, 2015;
Sutton, 2010). Varga summarises this newer principle: “External entities, rather than
being mereological parts, are seen as complementary tools that become integrated into one
cognitive system” (Varga, 2015, p. 2). Both complementarity and parity are likely to
be important ways to look at attachment relationships. In an individual’s ontogenetic
development, complementarity may come first, as when an infant receives highly com-
plementary support they are likely to ‘rate’ the caregiver high in terms of responsiveness
and sensitivity, and these are the measures used in ‘deciding’ on whether the caregivers is
a reliable secure-base from which to explore, and haven of safety. As was discussed above
with regard to the research of Corriveau et al. (2009), infants and children can relate to
their caregivers as more or less reliable elements of their own epistemic actions. If a child
is very trusting of their caregiver then using their caregiver as an information source al-
lows them to ‘economise’ on ‘source checking’ (Gilbert, 1991) and use information from
their caregivers as their own reasoning or memories. Sutton, Harris, Keil, and Barnier
(2010) provide a fitting example to illustrate this issue: “A 12-year-old boy looks up from
his homework and asks in a serious tone: ‘Mom, what is my most important memory?’,”.
The child could ask this question to someone else who knew him. But the answer would
have a different status from his mother - who he trusts to a degree in part a result of the
level of responsiveness/sensitivity/complementarity she has previously provided. The key
issue is not to do with the complementarity of how he asks and she answers at that point
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in time, such as with matching voice tones or eye gaze. The key issue is: does the child
accept the answer as if it is his own memory or not? Future work may provide further
clarification on how the complementarity and parity principles link to different aspects of
attachment phenomena and how concepts such as extended emotions (Carter, Gordon,
& Palermos, 2016) can be accommodated in an integrated conceptual framework.
Whilst the hypotheses of the embedded and extended cognition can both provide new
thinking for Attachment Theory, the extended mind seems too strong and too radical to
re-frame Attachment Theory. Sometimes carers may be ‘transparent equipment’ for their
infants (Clark, 2008, page 80). But these occasions will be the exception rather than
the rule because the interests of infants and carers do not completely coincide (Haig,
1993; Simpson, 1999; Trivers, 1974). However, one of the strengths of both embedded
and extended accounts is that both explain a range of social interactions, from adaptive
control to linguistic self-reflection. So these approaches do not reject a core computational
and representational mind. For example, close coordination in attachment behaviours
ranges from close holding when infants ‘sink-in’ to their carers arms (Ainsworth et al.,
1978), to linguistically mediated attachment discourse (Dallos, 2006).
5. Enactivising Attachment Theory
The three varieties of enactivism considered in this section highlight various different
aspects of adaptive control and subjective experience in the attachment domain.
5.1. Attachment Theory encounters Sensorimotor Enactivism
Sensorimotor enactivism criticises the view that perception results in inner images or
mental representations being produced. In the sensorimotor view, perception, action, and
subjective perceptual experiences are all inescapably connected (Deganaar & O’Regan,
2014; Hutto & Myin, 2013). This approach allows that perceptual experience is grounded
in knowledge and is therefore representationally contentful. But the kind of mediat-
ing knowledge in sensorimotor enactivist accounts is more like procedural or skill-based
knowledge. It is ‘know-how’ rather than ‘know-that’, a kind of knowledge demonstrated
by the skilled performance of its deployment rather than an independently queriable
knowledge base (Hutto & Myin, 2013). Viewing attachment behavioural patterns in this
enactivist manner - as social skills rather than arising as a result of internal represen-
tations - may provide a powerful spur towards new research hypotheses and clinical
interventions.
Limitations of the sensorimotor enactivist approach are highlighted by describing a
non-4e theoretical competitor - the Predictive Processing theoretical framework (Clark,
2014, p. 241). This shares with sensorimotor enactivism that it is centred around making
predictions of the results of actions from what is known about the state of the world.
However, where sensorimotor enactivism focuses on a shallow view of the world (and
no representation of the internal states that map or model the world), the predictive
processing framework proposes hierarchical generative probabilistic models that can cap-
ture complex causal relationships at multiple levels of abstraction (Clark, 2013, 2014).
It posits the operation of a rich multi-level representational hierarchy but is opposed
to the passivity of traditional cognitivist representations. This is because in predictive
processing internal representations provide a constant stream of predictions about what
the perceptual system should actually being perceiving from the basic sensory data the
organism receives. All the time there is a mismatch between model derived prediction
15
May 13, 2016 Connection Science COS˙pettersAttachment˙4e˙cog˙revisionv4
and actual perception the model is updated to minimise the error. Because models in
predictive processing are ‘expectations’ they can also be used to look forward in time -
and hence are ready-made as simulation tools to imagine the outcomes of future actions.
So a good match for Bowlby’s concept of IWMs. Clark (2014) speculates that “such
mental simulations provide an appealing way of smoothing the path from basic forms of
embodied response to abilities of planning, deliberation and offline reflection”. (Clark,
2014, p. 240).
In conclusion, when individuals with insecure attachment gain secure status they can
be viewed as gaining a skill which they can then use in other relationships. However,
we should remember that whilst attachment phenomena includes skills and habits, any
framework for explaining attachment behaviour needs to explain attachment interactions
that are often mediated through language (Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Dallos,
2006).
5.2. Autopoeisis and representation from social interaction
According to autopoietic enactivism, cognition, mentality and subjective experience all
emerge from the self-organising and self-creating activities of autonomous entities (Hutto
& Myin, 2013). Autopoiesis is a complex process that places the organism centre stage
and is related to the simpler process of homeostasis. As with a system that shows home-
ostasis, an autopoietic organism actively monitors itself and reacts to perturbation, but
it is also self-produced and self-distinct (Di Paolo, 2009). Autopoiesis takes the position
that metabolism and life is essential for grounding intentional categories like cognition,
consciousness, and emotions (Boden, 2006).
Di Paolo (2009) proposes a concept of autopoiesis where behavioural habits, arise
from ‘within’, coordinating with the intimate details of ‘without’. So acting as a bridge
between the inner and extended domains. This form of enactivism suggests that, because
factors from ‘within’ and ‘without’ play equally important and necessary roles in creating
cognition and behaviour, the distinction between organism and environment is viewed
as only having a heuristic value rather than being a true metaphysical division (Hutto
& Myin, 2013).
Bowlby described how ‘inner’ mechanisms of self-control and physiological maintenance
are integrated with ‘outer’ behaviours, but a number of decades before Di Paolo. In
the second Volume of the Attachment Trilogy, Bowlby adopted the biological concept of
homeostasis for Attachment Theory and applied it to behavioural as well as physiological
control systems:
“Looked at in this light the regulatory systems that maintain a steady
relationship between an individual and his familiar environment can be
regarded as an ‘outer ring’ of life-maintaining systems complementary
to the ‘inner ring’ of systems that maintain physiological homeostasis.”
(Bowlby, 1973, p. 149)
So physiological homeostasis which regulates food and sleep are an inner ring of con-
trol in the attachment control system. Attachment behavioural patterns that bring about
proximity maintenance and exploration within overall secure-base patterns constitutes
an outer behavioural ring which is a complement to this inner physiological control
system (Bowlby 1973, chapter 9). However, Bowlby did not set out how the intimate
engagement of these two rings could give rise to phenomenological experience. He did
describe attachment feelings, but within an emotional appraisal framework ((Bowlby,
16
May 13, 2016 Connection Science COS˙pettersAttachment˙4e˙cog˙revisionv4
1969), chapter 7). Bowlby’s departure from using a psychoanalytic framework meant
jettisoning an approach directed towards explaining rich subjective experiences. Viewing
Attachment Theory through the lens of autopoietic enactivism can act as a spur for
a more comprehensive approach for Attachment Theory that unifies behaviour, cogni-
tion, and subjective experience in a single explanatory framework (Colombetti, 2014).
Whether mechanisms incorporated from autopoietic enactivism are found to be the best
way to do this within Attachment Theory is an open question. What an encounter be-
tween Attachment Theory and autopoietic enactivism highlights is that the cognitivist
mechanisms within Attachment Theory do not explain the feeling of being attached.
5.3. A Radical Enactivist Manifesto for Attachment Theory?
Hutto and Myin propose the thesis of radical enactive cognition (REC) that is a vari-
ant of enactivism that states that only a small proportion of cognitive processing is
mediated by contentful representations. In their view, the majority of human cognition
is basic and non-contentful information processing that controls behaviour for adaptive
purposes but does not possess truth bearing properties like reference, accuracy or im-
plication. According to REC, contentful representations do mediate some cognition, but
these representations play a minor role in cognition overall. As Hutto and Myin (2013,
p. 13) note“Yet even the most radical of enactvists need not, and should not, deny the
existence and importance of contentful and representationally based modes of thinking; it
is just that these should be regarded as emerging late in phylogeny and ontogeny, being
dependent in special sorts of shared practices” (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 13). The ‘shared
practices’ they refer to are exactly the kind of interaction that occurs in adult therapy or
adult and child relationship-talk. So what Hutto and Myin have proposed is a novel vari-
ant of a dual process approach to cognition, with linguistically mediated representations
that can interpret or receive narrative meanings, and basic structures and mechanisms
that carry out adaptive control (Petters & Waters, 2010). However, whilst other dual
process approaches make a distinction between self-reflective thought which is linguis-
tically mediated and conscious, and processing which is not linguistically mediated and
inaccessible to consciousness, REC ‘carves things up’ in a very different way (Petters &
Waters, 2010). As Hutto and Myin note, “Enactivists are concerned to defend the view
that our most elementary ways of engaging with the world and others - including our
basic forms of perception and perceptual experience - are mindful in the sense of being
phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-representational and
content-free” (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 13).
So according to a REC approach to Attachment Theory, an IWM that is formed
early in ontogeny and has become inaccessible to linguistic self-reflection is not ‘hidden’,
or ‘behind’ or ‘beneath’ other more linguistically accessible IWMs. Instead, REC re-
frames inaccessibility - so in REC this is just linguistic inaccessibility. Such inaccessible
structures are still at the forefront of mind and are phenomenally charged and conscious.
This re-framing can turn therapeutic ideas right around. Instead of therapy uncovering
hidden structures it is about understanding how context and behavioural predispositions
enact these structures in the moments they occur.
In addition, REC holds that an organism’s current behavioural tendencies are not
explained or structured by representations of the past but influenced more directly, just
by its “history of active engagement.” with the world ((Hutto & Myin, 2013), p 11-12). So
an organism’s behavioural predispositions do “not inherently “say” anything about how
things stand in the world” ((Hutto & Myin, 2013), p 19). Rather, according to Hutto and
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Myin, “a truly radical enactivism - REC - holds that it is possible to explain a creature’s
capacity to perceive, keep track of, and act appropriately with respect to some object or
property without positing internal structures that function to represent, refer to, or stand
for the object or property in question” (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p 82).
So if Attachment Theory follows REC it might reconceive internal states like working
models to be just control states and break the link with the reality they are supposed to
represent. In one view, an attachment control system that proposes internal control states
are not truthful representations of reality is a profound shift from current Attachment
Theory. No longer would attachment interventions be concerned to assess how individuals
represented their past relationships but instead they would be more focused on how
to move towards more adaptive behaviour patterns. However, in another view, seeing
internal states as de-linked from contentful representation suggests a link back to part
of the psychodynamic way of thinking from which Attachment Theory originated (but
without going back to outdated aspects like Drive Theory). Attachment Theory was
formulated to provide answers to several related questions: how are early experiences
recorded in a way that they impact later experiences?; what changes as a result of
previous experience?; and what changes during different timescales, over days, weeks
or months? Ainsworth explored this issue when she discussed how what occurs over
previous days may affect the sub-categories found in the Strange Situation (Ainsworth
et al., 1978). One answer is the infant’s persistent state. When a baby has become
anxious or worried, ‘on edge’, this might be measured with a cortisol assessment. This
is not the representation of information in memory. A second answer is that the baby
has attached some kind of meaning to the experience. This ‘meaning making’ reaction
might be mediated through information processing mechanisms such as encoding into
memory that works through a longer period of time than physiological state. There is also
another longer term way of recording experience which is that there is structural change
in the form of the whole information processing architecture. This latter suggestion for
how experience is recorded reminiscent of ideas comes from the psychoanalytic tradition
and is the idea that experience was recorded in terms of building structures of mental
energy and defence ((Horowitz, 1988) p 17). Little dykes to keep drives from flooding
off in certain directions and ditches to direct energy in other directions. So the idea that
Attachment Theory may borrow from REC is that structure is the residue of experience
that filters and biases future behaviour.
One of Bowlby’s contributions in his revision of the psychoanalytic framework was to
introduce the idea of information, rather than structure, as the means of recording past
experience. IMWs that act as memories and that provide simulations of the future only
really works with such an information processing formulation. In the view proposed here,
that is in accord with the basic minds approach of REC and also draws upon old psy-
choanalytic ideas in a new context, the attachment control system grows in a way that
records what it experiences during its development. The elements (building blocks) for
an attachment control system, as a result of experience, thus become coordinated into
a system to give a particular structural form. Taking on this idea does not mean that
Attachment Theory would regress back to a psychoanalytic framework. An encounter
between enactivism and Attachment Theory asks: should Attachment Theory incorpo-
rate the idea that experience can be recorded in terms of how information processing
structures are built in addition to representing key attachment experiences in memory?
A REC approach to the human mind suggests that a large proportion of information
processing is non-contentful. So, in the attachment domain, a REC view might accept
that relationship talk involves representational content, but this kind of representation
is not part of adaptive control in behaviour patterns like exploration from a secure base
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or return to a safe haven provided by the mother. Following REC, when a rat pup or a
gosling returns to its mother we might consider it is not producing plans and goals with
representational content. However, in humans, from an early age adaptive control guid-
ing organisms towards their goals occurs alongside relationship talk about those goals.
Mechanisms of adaptive control can then be mediated - inhibited or activated or oth-
erwise directed - by mechanisms that involve representational content. This may occur
repeatedly over ontogenetic development leaving long-lasting biases - so adaptive con-
trol ends up being finely shaped by linguistically presented ideas. Is it then correct to
call these mechanisms of adaptive control non-contentful? Of course, the nature of how
adaptive control in the attachment system is shaped by activities like relationship talk is
an empirical question. But as we saw in section 5.1 the predictive processing framework
(Clark, 2014) provides a strong alternative to sensorimotor enactivism, and it is also an
alternative to the adaptive control of basic minds presented in this section that would
support close interaction between lower level control mechanisms and higher level lin-
guistic mediation. So future work can more closely examine whether Attachment Theory
is best revised within a ‘representation friendly’ framework (Pouw & de Jong, 2015) or
the more radical approach of basic REC minds (Hutto & Myin, 2013).
6. Conclusion
In breaking from psychoanalysis Bowlby was a revolutionary, but at heart he was also a
conservative, because he wanted to save the core and most valuable findings of Freud’s
psychoanalytic framework. These were insights about the highly active and interactive
nature of social and emotional development in infancy. Since Bowlby was an eager ‘bor-
rower’ of scientific concepts from the ideas which were popular at the time he formulated
Attachment Theory, he might today look to incorporate the diverse insights of 4e cog-
nition in a revised framework for the attachment control system. In section 2 we asked
whether IWMs in adults are linked both to processes of shared meaning making and in-
terpretation, and to processes of adaptive control, that is, whether they should not only
be conceived in linguistic or symbolic form, but also conceived as analogue or embodied
information processing structures. In section 4 we showed how embedded and extended
cognition provide possible explanations for how infants derive support from their care-
givers. The approach of embedded cognition is closer to the stance taken by Attachment
Theory as it is now understood. The hypothesis of extended cognition may prove fruitful
in stimulating new empirical directions but will perhaps be too radical for the intuitions
of attachment researchers, partly because of the way it presents infant and carer inter-
action so unequally. Then in section 5 we considered how an enactivist approach can
help explain subjective experiences in attachment interactions, and how internal control
structures can direct future actions without a link to ‘truthful’ representations of past
events.
Considering issues of embodiment, embedding, extension, and enactivism together has
a major benefit because these four approaches pull in different directions. So together
they provide a balanced reformulation for Attachment Theory. Considering IWMs as
analogue in addition to symbolic keeps the IWM construct tied to an individual. The
embedded and extended cognition approaches reminds us of the dialogic nature of attach-
ment and the enactive approach forces us to question our representational assumptions
and consider a place for subjective experience in our explanations. Taken together these
perspectives complement each other. Future work might focus on how the 4e perspective
provides empirical payoffs in attachment research on sensitivity to signals, cooperation
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with ongoing behaviour, acceptance of baby’s needs (babyness), and physical/emotional
availability. Research might also explore how the 4e components influences the measure-
ment of secure base phenomenon, such as exploring away from mother with her in mind
and retreating to her for comfort or being comforted by expectation of her availability
and responsiveness. We can never really know how Bowlby would have responded to the
questions posed by 4e cognition but we can act to make revisions to Attachment Theory
that conserve his key theoretical insights.
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